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Aggressive leaders
Federico Etro∗
I characterize the incentives to undertake strategic investments in markets with Nash competi-
tion and endogenous entry. Contrary to the case with an exogenous number of ﬁrms, when the
investment increases marginal proﬁtability, only a “top dog” strategy is optimal. For instance,
under both quantity and price competition, a market leader overinvests in cost reductions and
overproduces complement products. The purpose of the strategic investment is to allow the ﬁrm
to be more aggressive in the market and to reduce its price below those of other ﬁrms. Contrary
to the post-Chicago approach, this shows that aggressive pricing strategies are not necessarily
associated with exclusionary purposes.
1. Introduction
 In many market settings, a ﬁrm can have an incentive to undertake preliminary investments to
gain advantage over its competitors. For instance, when Cournot competition takes place between
two ﬁrms, one of them will usually gain by overinvesting to reduce costs, which allows it to be
aggressive in the market, expanding production and inducing its rivals to produce less. Under
Bertrand competition, however, the same ﬁrm would prefer to underinvest in cost reductions so
as to be accommodating, increasing its price so as to induce its rivals to raise their price. More
generally, Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) and Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985), building
on a pathbreaking contribution by Dixit (1980), have shown that when a preliminary investment
increases marginal proﬁtability, a ﬁrm would like to overinvest under strategic substitutability
and underinvest under strategic complementarity: the ﬁrst top dog strategy leads to aggressive
behavior in the market (higher production or lower price), while the second “puppy dog” strategy
induces accommodating behavior (lower production or higher price).
In this article I show that when entry is endogenous, a ﬁrm would always like to undertake
investments to be aggressive in the market, that is, to expand production under Cournot competition
and decrease prices under Bertrand competition. For instance, a leader will always ﬁnd it optimal
to overinvest in cost reductions (or adopt a similar top dog strategy) to be able to produce more and
to reduce its price below the price of its competitors. This outcome emerges in many other contexts
with surprising results about investments in quality improvements, production of complementary
goods, dumping to exploit a learning curve or create network externalities, strategic vertical
restraints, bundling of goods, and so on.
∗ University of Milan, Intertic, and Etro Consulting; fetro@intertic.org.
I thank Robert Barro, David de Meza, Karina Firme, Greg Mankiw, Massimo Motta, Jean Tirole, Kresimir Zigic,
three anonymous referees, and participants in seminars at Harvard University, MIT, CERGE (Prague), University of Milan,
and EUI (Florence) where these ideas were presented. I am grateful to the Editor, Joseph Harrington, who provided many
important suggestions to improve the article, which is drawn from my dissertation on “Market Leaders and Industrial
Policy.”
146 Copyright © 2006, RAND.
mss # Etro; art. # 9; RAND Journal of Economics vol. 37(1)
ETRO / 147
The intuition for the generalized aggressive behavior of leaders in competitive markets is
simple. With a ﬁxed number of ﬁrms, the leader is mainly concerned about the reactions of the other
ﬁrms to its own investments, but these reactions are different under quantity competition or price
competition (more precisely, according to whether strategic substitutability or complementarity
holds). But when entry is endogenous, the leader is mainly concerned about the effect of its own
investment on entry. An investment that induces the leader to be accommodating will attract entry,
which makes such a strategy unproﬁtable. An investment that induces the leader to be aggressive
will limit entry and allow the leader to achieve a larger market share and gain from a reduction in
the average costs of production. This implies that a dominant position obtained through strategic
investments can be the consequence of a competitive market environment and not the result of
barriers to entry.1 The practical implication is that competition policy should focus on promoting
endogenous entry rather than ﬁghting against market leaders, their dominant market shares, their
aggressive pricing or bundling strategies, and their innovative investments.
The article is organized as follows. In Section 2, I develop a simple example where leadership
is associated with a simple ﬁrst-mover advantage rather than a proper strategic investment; it serves
to show, in a simple way, the source of the aggressive behavior of leaders. In Section 3, I present
the general model of strategic investment and Nash competition, and in Section 4, I solve it with
and without barriers to entry. In Section 5, I study some applications under quantity and price
competition with alternative forms of strategic commitments. Section 6 concludes.
2. A simple example
 In this section I will present a textbook example of Stackelberg competition in quantities
and extend it to endogenous entry. The objective is to convey in the simplest terms the mecha-
nism relating endogenous entry to aggressive behavior of the leaders. A more general model of
Stackelberg competition with free entry is fully characterized in Etro (2002a).
Consider quantity competition between n ﬁrms facing a linear inverse demand p = a − X ,
where a > 0 and X is total production in the market, while constant marginal cost is c ∈ [0, a)
and F > 0 is the ﬁxed cost. One of the ﬁrms is a leader and can choose its production xL in a
ﬁrst stage before the other ﬁrms. Followers choose their quantities xi playing in Nash strategies
between themselves in a second stage.
As is well known, when the number of potential entrants is exogenous, the leader foresees how
total production by the followers responds and accordingly decides how much to produce. Hence,
as long as the number of ﬁrms is small enough, in equilibrium the leader produces xL = (a− c)/2
and each follower produces x = (a − c)/2n.
When there is endogenous entry of ﬁrms, only a limited number of them enter and produce
in equilibrium, and hence their number n is endogenous. In such a case, the leader foresees
how the production of each follower and also the number of followers will change with its own
production. In particular, given a small enough quantity xL produced by the leader, each entrant
would produce x = (a−c−xL )/n, and the zero-proﬁt constraint would ﬁx the number of followers
at n = (a − c − xL )/
√
F , which is decreasing in the production of the leader. This implies that
each one of the followers would produce x =
√
F . Given this, the net proﬁt function perceived
by the leader in the ﬁrst stage, as long as there is some entry of followers (that is for n ≥ 2 or
xL ≤ a − c − 2
√
F ), is
π L = xL
√
F − F.
It is now clear that the leader always prefers to produce so that entry is avoided; that is, xL =
a − c − 2√F . In other words, there are never followers in equilibrium and total production is
X = xL = a − c − 2
√
F .
1 In this article I will associate barriers to entry with an exogenous number of ﬁrms. Notice that, when I endogenize
entry, I am actually endogenizing the role of these barriers in constraining entry.
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In conclusion, when the number of potential entrants is low enough, the market is character-
ized by all these ﬁrms being active, while when there are many potential entrants and a free-entry
equilibrium is achieved, there is just one ﬁrm in equilibrium: the leader.
The outcome is not always so extreme: as I have shown in Etro (2002a), we would have
some entry in case of imperfect substitutability between goods, under both quantity competition2
and price competition, or in the presence of U-shaped cost functions, but in all these cases the
leader would still be aggressive, producing more and selling at lower prices than the followers (as
long as endogenous entry holds).3 A similar result emerges when the leader does not have a ﬁrst-
mover advantage but can undertake a preliminary investment that affects its marginal proﬁtability,
creating an endogenous asymmetry with respect to the other ﬁrms. I now turn to this case.
3. The model
 In this section I will present a model of Nash competition with strategic investment. Since
my main focus is on equilibria with endogenous entry, I need a general model that can account
for multiple ﬁrms and has proﬁts decreasing when new ﬁrms enter. I will present such a general
framework and then show that standard models of quantity and price competition are nested in it.
Consider n ﬁrms choosing a strategic variable xi > 0 with i = 1, 2, . . . , n. They all compete
in Nash strategies, that is, taking as given each other’s strategies. These strategies deliver for each
ﬁrm i the net proﬁt function
πi =  (xi , βi , k)− F, (1)
where F > 0 is a ﬁxed cost of production. The ﬁrst argument is the strategy of ﬁrm i , and I
assume that gross proﬁts are quasi-concave in xi .
The second argument represents the effects (or spillovers) induced by the strategies of the
other ﬁrms on ﬁrm i’s proﬁts, summarized by βi =
∑n
k=1,k =i h(xk) for some function h(x) that
is assumed positive, differentiable, and increasing. These spillovers exert a negative effect on
proﬁts, 2 < 0. In general, the cross effect 12 could be positive, so that we have strategic
complementarity (SC), or negative, so that we have strategic substitutability (SS). I will deﬁne
strategy xi as aggressive compared to strategy x j when xi > x j and accommodating when the
opposite holds. Notice that a more aggressive strategy by one ﬁrm reduces the proﬁts of the other
ﬁrms.
The last argument of the proﬁt function is a proﬁt-enhancing factor (3 > 0) that for all ﬁrms
except the leader is constant at a level ¯k. Only the leader is able to make a strategic precommitment
on k in a preliminary stage. For simplicity, the cost of its strategic investment is given by a function
f (k) with f ′(k) > 0 and f ′′(k) > 0. My focus will be exactly on the incentives for this ﬁrm to
undertake such an investment so as to maximize its total proﬁts,4
πL (k) = L (xL , βL , k)− f (k)− F, (2)
where xL is the strategy of the leader and βL =
∑
j =L h(x j ). We may say that the investment
makes the leader tough when L13 > 0, that is, an increase in k increases the marginal proﬁtability
of its strategy, while the investment makes the leader soft in the opposite case (L13 < 0).
2 Consider a slight variation of the above model with inverse demand a − xi − b
∑
j =i x j for ﬁrm i , where
b ∈ (0, 1] is an index of substitutability between goods. In this case, for b small enough, it is easy to verify that we have
entry in equilibrium and each entrant produces x =
√
F , while the leader produces xL = x(2− b)/2(1− b). Hence, when
goods are only partially substitutable, the leader allows some entry but still produces more than any single entrant, selling
its own good at a lower price.
3 The same aggressive behavior emerges for investment in innovation by leaders in patent races (Etro, 2004).
Finally, this aggressive behavior of the leaders improves the allocation of resources compared to a basic Nash equilibrium;
the welfare and policy implications of Stackelberg games with free entry are examined further in Etro (2002a).
4 To avoid confusion, I will add the label L to denote the proﬁt function, the strategy, and the spillovers of the
leader.
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Most of the commonly used models of oligopolistic competition in quantities and in prices
are nested in my general speciﬁcation.5 For instance, consider a market with quantity competition
so that the strategy xi represents the quantity produced by ﬁrm i . The corresponding inverse
demand for ﬁrm i is pi = p[xi ,
∑
j =i h(x j )], which is decreasing in both arguments (goods are
substitutes). The cost function is c(xi ), with c′(·) > 0. It follows that gross proﬁts for ﬁrm i are
 (xi , βi ) = xi p (xi , βi )− c(xi ). (3)
Examples include linear and iso-elastic demands and other common cases. This setup satisﬁes
my general assumptions under weak conditions and can locally imply SS (as in most cases) or
SC.
Consider now models of price competition where pi is the price of ﬁrm i . Any model with
direct demand,
Di = D
[
pi ,
n∑
j=1, j =i
g(p j )
]
where D1 < 0, D2 < 0,g′(p) < 0,
is nested in my general framework after setting xi ≡ 1/pi and h(xi ) = g(1/xi ). This speciﬁcation
guarantees that goods are substitutes in a standard way, since ∂ Di/∂p j = D2g′(p j ) > 0. For
instance, following Vives (1999), when utility is iso-elastic as u = [∑nj=1 Cθj ]γ − ∑nj=1 C j p j ,
with θ ∈ (0, 1] and γ ∈ (0, 1/θ ), demand for good i can be derived as
Di ∝
p
− 11−θ
i[∑n
j=1 p
− θ1−θ
j
] 1−γ
1−γ θ
,
which is nested in my framework after setting g(p) = p−θ/(1−θ ), while a logit demand is
Di =
e−λpi∑n
j=1 e−λp j
,
which requires g(p) = e−λp.6 Adopting, just for simplicity, a constant marginal cost c, I obtain
the gross proﬁts for ﬁrm i ,
 (xi , βi ) =
(
1
xi
− c
)
D
(
1
xi
, βi
)
= (pi − c) D (pi , βi ) , (4)
which is nested in my general model and, under weak conditions assumed throughout the article,
implies SC.
We can now note that a more aggressive strategy corresponds to a higher production level
in models of quantity competition and a lower price under price competition. In these models, I
can introduce many kinds of preliminary investments, as we will see later on.
4. Strategic investment by the leader
 I will now solve for the equilibrium in the two-stage model where the leader chooses its
preliminary investment in the ﬁrst stage and all ﬁrms compete in Nash strategies in the second
stage.
5 Other models of oligopolistic interaction such as patent races and contests are also nested in my general frame-
work, but I have discussed them elsewhere (Etro, 2002a; 2004). In the following examples I omit the variable k for
simplicity.
6 Other examples include constant expenditure demand functions and the general class of demand functions
introduced by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). Notice that linear demands are not nested in my model.
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For a given preliminary investment k by the leader, the second stage where ﬁrms compete in
Nash strategies is characterized by a system of n optimality conditions. For the sake of simplicity,
I follow Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) by assuming that a unique symmetric equilibrium exists
and that there is entry of some followers for any possible preliminary investment.7 Given the
symmetry of the model, in equilibrium each follower chooses a common strategy x and the leader
chooses a strategy xL satisfying the optimality conditions
1
[
x, (n − 2)h(x) + h(xL ), ¯k
]
= 0 (5)
L1 [xL , (n − 1)h(x), k] = 0, (6)
where I use the fact that in equilibrium the spillovers for each follower are β = (n−2)h(x)+h(xL )
and for the leader are βL = (n − 1)h(x).
Before analyzing the model with endogenous entry, it is convenient to brieﬂy summarize the
results in the presence of an exogenous number of ﬁrms, which have been the focus of most of the
research in the post-Chicago approach to industrial organization. The system (5)–(6) provides the
equilibrium values of the strategies as functions of the preliminary investment, x(k) and xL (k),
whose comparative statics can easily be derived. In the ﬁrst stage the leader chooses its investment
k to maximize
πL (k) = L {xL (k), (n − 1)h [x(k)] , k} − f (k)− F,
and it is immediate to obtain the optimality condition,
L3 +
h′(xL )L13L2 12

= f ′(k), (7)
where the second term on the left-hand side represents the strategic incentive to commit to k.8
The sign of this incentive is the opposite of the sign of 12L13. Hence, we have the following
traditional result: with an exogenous number of ﬁrms, (i) when the leader is tough (L13 > 0),
strategic overinvestment (underinvestment) occurs under SS (SC), inducing a top dog (puppy
dog) strategy; (ii) when the leader is soft (L13 < 0), strategic underinvestment (overinvestment)
occurs under SS (SC), inducing a “lean and hungry” (“fat cat”) strategy.
The intuition behind this result is important for what follows. Basically, under SS the leader
gains from committing to aggressive behavior in the market and can accomplish such a task
by overinvesting or underinvesting strategically when the investment promotes aggressive or
accommodating behavior. Otherwise, under SC the leader tries to commit to accommodating
behavior in the market and can achieve this by adopting the opposite kind of strategy. The ultimate
behavior of the leader in the market depends on whether strategies are substitutes or complements.
I will now consider the case of endogenous entry, assuming that the number of potential
entrants is great enough that a zero-proﬁt condition pins down the number of active ﬁrms, n.9 The
equilibrium conditions in the second stage for a given preliminary investment k are the optimality
conditions (5)–(6) and the zero-proﬁt condition for the followers:

[
x, (n − 2)h(x) + h(xL ), ¯k
]
= F. (8)
I can now prove that a change in the strategic commitment by the leader does not affect the
equilibrium strategies of the other ﬁrms, but it reduces their equilibrium number. Let us use the
7 Conditions for existence and uniqueness can be found in the literature on speciﬁc games (see Vives, 1999, for
a survey). Clearly, when the investment is not very costly, a leader may adopt an extreme strategy to deter entry; such an
exclusionary strategy was already pointed out by Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), so I will not focus on it.
8 Here  = [L11/(n − 1)h′(x)][11 + (n − 2)h′(x)12] + L1212 is positive by the assumption of the stability
of the system (5)–(6).
9 One can think of this as a three-stage game, adding an intermediate stage where potential followers decide
whether to enter or not. As is customary in the literature, I will assume n is a real number.
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fact that βL = β + h(x) − h(xL ) to rewrite the three equilibrium equations in terms of x , β, and
xL :

(
x, β, ¯k
)
= F, 1
(
x, β, ¯k
)
= 0, L1 [xL , β + h(x)− h(xL ), k] = 0.
This system is block recursive and stable under the condition L11− h′(xL )L12 < 0. The ﬁrst two
equations provide the equilibrium values for the strategy of the followers and their spillovers, x
and β, which are independent of k, while the last equation provides the equilibrium strategy of
the leader xL (k) as a function of k, with xL (¯k) = x and
x ′L (k) = −
L13
L11 − h′(xL )L12
0 for L130.
In the ﬁrst stage, the optimal choice of investment k for the leader maximizes
πL (k) = L {xL (k), β + h(x)− h [xL (k)] , k} − f (k)− F,
and hence it satisﬁes the optimality condition
L3 +
h′(xL )L2 L13
L11 − h′(xL )L12
= f ′(k), (9)
where the sign of the second term is just the sign of L13. This implies that the leader has a positive
strategic incentive to invest when it is tough (L13 > 0) and a negative one when it is soft.
Since my focus is on the strategic incentive to invest, I will normalize the proﬁt functions in
such a way that, in the absence of strategic motivations, the leader would choose k = ¯k, resulting
in a symmetric situation with the other ﬁrms.10 Consequently, we can conclude that a tough leader
overinvests compared to the other ﬁrms, in the sense that k > ¯k, while a soft leader underinvests.
We also notice that a tough leader is made more aggressive by overinvesting and a soft leader is
made more aggressive by underinvesting. Finally, the strategy of the other ﬁrms is independent
of the investment of the leader. Hence, we can conclude that the leader will always be more
aggressive in the market than any other ﬁrm. Summarizing, we have the following.
Proposition 1. Under Nash competition with endogenous entry, when the strategic investment
makes the leader tough (soft), overinvestment (underinvestment) occurs, but the leader is always
more aggressive than the other ﬁrms.
Basically, under endogenous entry, the taxonomy of Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) boils
down to two simple kinds of investment and an unambiguous aggressive behavior in the market:
whenever L13 > 0, it is always optimal to adopt a top dog strategy with overinvestment in the
ﬁrst stage so as to be aggressive in the second stage; when L13 < 0, we always have a lean
and hungry look with underinvestment, but the behavior in the second stage is still aggressive.
Strategic investment is always used as a commitment to be more aggressive in a market with
endogenous entry, and this does not depend on the kind of competition or strategic interaction
between the ﬁrms. As we will see in the applications of the next section, the result is particularly
drastic for markets with price competition. In these markets, leaders are accommodating in the
presence of entry barriers (choosing higher prices than their competitors), but they are aggressive
under endogenous entry (choosing lower prices). This difference may be useful for empirical
research on barriers to entry and may have crucial implications for antitrust policy. For instance,
Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) and the following post-Chicago approach have shown that aggressive
pricing can only have a predatory purpose in a duopoly with price competition, while I have shown
that, when entry is endogenous, aggressive pricing is not necessarily associated with exclusionary
10 This requires L3 (x, β, ¯k) = f ′(¯k). Such a normalization does not affect qualitatively the incentives to adopt
strategic investments and has a realistic motivation. We can imagine that all ﬁrms choose k but only the leader can do it
before the others and commit to it, hence only a strategic motivation can induce the leader to choose a different investment.
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purposes (see Etro, 2006, for a discussion of the antitrust implications, with particular reference
to the Microsoft case).
5. Applications
 The results above have many applications in both industrial organization and other related
ﬁelds. For instance, in the theory of trade policy, I can show that export subsidies are always the
optimal unilateral trade policy for ﬁrms active in third countries where entry is free. Hence, the
ambiguous results obtained by Eaton and Grossman (1986) collapse under free entry (which is
actually in the interest of the third country). Notice that a subsidy implies L13 > 0 under both
quantity and price competition, and the optimal subsidy that maximizes proﬁts of the domestic
ﬁrm net of the cost of the subsidy plays the same role of an optimal strategic commitment chosen
by the same ﬁrm.11
Here, I will limit the discussion to an overview of applications in the ﬁeld of industrial
organization. The focus will be on investments in technological improvements (which shift the
cost function) and quality improvements (which shift the demand function), and I will also
describe other related strategic investments. Future research may study other forms of strategic
commitment by leaders in competitive markets, since most of the post-Chicago research has
abstracted from endogenous entry choices. For instance, even the incentives to bundling different
products change according to the entry conditions. In a simple example, Whinston (1990) has
shown that a monopolist in one market does not have incentives to bundle its product with another
one sold in a duopolistic secondary market unless this deters entry in the latter, and that this
corresponds to a puppy dog strategy (since bundling makes the monopolist tough). However,
under endogenous entry in the secondary market, bundling at a low price may become the optimal
top dog strategy without an entry-deterrence purpose. This may have radical implications for
competition policy (think of the bundling strategies of Microsoft), since it shows that bundling is
an efﬁcient (and also welfare enhancing) strategy by dominant ﬁrms.
 Cost-reducing investments. My ﬁrst application is to a standard situation where a ﬁrm
can adopt preliminary investments to improve its production technology and hence reduce its
cost function. Traditional results on the opportunity of these investments for market leaders are
ambiguous under barriers to entry, but, as I will show, they are not when entry is endogenous.
From now on, I will assume for simplicity that marginal costs are constant. Here, the leader can
invest k and reduce its marginal cost to c(k) > 0 with c′(k) < 0, while marginal cost is ﬁxed for
all the other ﬁrms.
Consider ﬁrst a model of quantity competition. The gross proﬁt of the leader is
L (xL , βL , k) = xL p (xL , βL )− c(k)xL . (10)
Notice that L12 has an ambiguous sign, but L13 = −c′(k) > 0. Hence, the leader may
overinvest or underinvest with barriers to entry but, according to Proposition 1, will always
overinvest in cost reduction and produce more than the other ﬁrms when entry is endogenous.12
Consider now the model of price competition where the leader can invest to reduce its
marginal costs in the same way and its proﬁt function is
L (xL , βL , k) =
[
1
xL
− c(k)
]
D
(
1
xL
, βL
)
, (11)
where L13 = c′(k)D1/x2L > 0. Hence, underinvestment in cost reduction emerges when there are
barriers to entry, but overinvestment is optimal when there is endogenous entry. Whenever entry
11 In Etro (2002b) I explicitly derive the optimal positive export subsidies under quantity and price competition,
and I also apply the results to other forms of export promotion, as competitive devaluations.
12 For instance, assuming inverse demand p = a −∑ xi with c(k) = c− dk and f (k) = k2/2, for d small enough,
the leader invests k = 2d
√
F/(1 − 2d2) and produces xL =
√
F/(1 − 2d2), while all entrants produce x = √F . Notice
that for a large enough d the leader would invest more to deter entry and remain alone in the market.
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is endogenous, the leader wants to improve its cost function to be more aggressive in the market
by selling its good at a lower price. Welfare analysis is beyond the scope of this article, but in this
case one can show that leadership improves the allocation of resources: this is due not only to the
cost reduction but also to the improved allocation of resources.13 Summarizing, we have the next
proposition.
Proposition 2. Under both quantity and price competition with endogenous entry, a ﬁrm always
has an incentive to overinvest in cost reduction and to be more aggressive than the other ﬁrms in
the market.
This result has a number of indirect applications. The theory of strategic vertical restraints
suggests that under price competition, a ﬁrm has incentives to choose vertical separation and
charge its retailer a franchise fee together with a wholesale price above marginal cost to induce an
accommodating behavior (Bonanno and Vickers, 1988); however, if entry in the market is free,
the optimal strategy is always aggressive and implies a wholesale price below marginal cost.
Other interesting applications are available in the case of multimarket competition, where
cost reduction can be obtained indirectly through production in other markets. For instance, if k is
production in a separate market and there are economies of scope, in the sense that the marginal
cost in one market is decreasing in the production in the other, the leader will always overproduce
in both markets to reduce its marginal costs.14
Finally, I can apply the results to dynamic models of learning by doing, where the cost
function is decreasing in past production. A leader will always overproduce before entry takes
place to exploit the learning curve and gain a strategic advantage over the entrants.15 Contrary to
the case with barriers to entry, analyzed by Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985), these
results do not depend on whether SS or SC holds.
 Demand-enhancing investments. Consider now investments that affect the demand func-
tion of a ﬁrm, such as investment for quality improvements, which tend to increase demand
and also reduce the substitutability between goods.16 Under free entry, the aim of the leader is
always to be aggressive in the market, but different strategies emerge under quantity and price
competition.
Consider a model of quantity competition characterized by the demand function p (xL , βL , k)
for the leader, where the marginal effect of investment on inverse demand is positive (p3 > 0),
while the effect on its slope is negative (p13 < 0), which implies that a higher investment not only
increases demand but also makes it more inelastic. Its gross proﬁt becomes
L (xL , βL , k) = xL [p (xL , βL , k)− c] . (12)
Hence, we have L13 = p3(1 − η), where η ≡ −xL p31/p3 is the elasticity of the marginal effect
of investment on demand with respect to production. As long as this elasticity is less than unitary
(investment does not make demand too inelastic), we have L13 > 0. Consequently, while under
barriers to entry the investment choice of the leader depends on many factors, under endogenous
entry overinvestment takes place if and only if η < 1.17 Whether this is the case or not, the leader
ends up selling more than any other ﬁrm.18
13 In Etro (2002a) I show that a Stackelberg equilibrium with free entry improves the allocation of resources
compared to a Marshallian equilibrium, that is, a Nash equilibrium for models of quantity and price competition and
patent races where entry is free.
14 Notice, however, that the opposite result (underproduction) holds in the presence of joint diseconomies.
15 The opposite result (underproduction) holds, however, when initial production increases future marginal cost
(which is the case of natural resource markets).
16 Investment in informative advertising has a similar role, so my conclusions apply to that case as well.
17 The model can also be reinterpreted in terms of product differentiation when inverse demand for the leader is
p[xL + b(k)βL ], where b(k), with b′(k) < 0, is an index of substitutability between the goods of the leader and all the
others. In this case, it can be veriﬁed that η < 1 if and only if strategic substitutability holds.
18 An analogous result applies in dynamic models with network effects creating demand externalities, where
demand is enhanced by past production and the consequent diffusion of the product across customers. For instance, if
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Under price competition we have demand for the leader D(1/xL , βL , k) with D3 > 0 and
D13 > 0, and the gross proﬁt becomes
L (xL , βL , k) =
(
1
xL
− c
)
D
(
1
xL
, βL , k
)
, (13)
where L13 = −[D3 +(1/xL−c)D13]/x2L < 0. In this case, under barriers to entry the leader would
overinvest in quality improvements to increase its price and exploit the induced increase in the
price of the competitors. However, under endogenous entry the behavior of the leader radically
changes and there is always underinvestment in quality improvements so as to reduce the price
below that of the followers. Summarizing, we have the ﬁnal proposition.
Proposition 3. Under quantity competition with endogenous entry, a ﬁrm has an incentive to
overinvest in quality as long as this does not make demand too inelastic; under price competition
with endogenous entry, the leader always has an incentive to underinvest in quality.
Finally, notice that these results apply also in the presence of multimarket competition with
demand complementarities between separate markets. The bottom line for all these applications
is that endogenous entry overturns common wisdom obtained by models with barriers to entry,
especially under price competition.
6. Conclusions
 I have studied market structures with market leaders engaging in preliminary investments.
When there are barriers to entry, the optimal behavior of the leaders depends on whether strategic
investment makes the followers more or less aggressive, which is ultimately an empirical question
for each single market. However, when entry is endogenous, the optimal behavior of leaders is
much simpler: they should always adopt preliminary investments that allow them to be more
aggressive in the market.
An interesting ﬁnding is that a market can be dominated by a leader and yet be competitive.
I have shown that, under price competition, in the presence of barriers to entry a leader would
underinvest in cost reduction so as to maintain high prices in the market, while the opposite happens
if entry is endogenous. This kind of result suggests that the priority of antitrust authorities should
be ﬁghting barriers to entry rather than aggressive market leaders.
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inverse demand for the leader is p(xL + βL )φ(k), where φ(k) is some increasing function of past production k, we have
η < 0, so the leader will overproduce before entry takes place to create network effects.
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